

ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

OS REGISTRY

SUBJECT: (Optional)

APEX - A Single System

FILE

See 18
See 17

FROM:

Director of Security
4E60 Hqs

EXTENSION

NO.

OS 0 0951/7-A

DATE

1 9 SEP 1980

TO: (Officer designation, room number, and building)

DATE

OFFICER'S INITIALS

COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)

STAT

SA/DCI/C
7E-12 Hqs

Harry:

Attached herewith is another iteration of the proposed memo to the DCI on APEX. Since our last discussion, we have implemented the change in SCI transferability mentioned in the memorandum. I believe, therefore, that the upbeat nature of the memorandum is justified. I remain, of course, open to discussion of any specific points with which you may disagree.

Distribution:

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1 - PPG

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OS/P&M/PPG/ [] : SW
(17Sep80)

OS 0 0951/7-A

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

STAT FROM:

[REDACTED]
Special Assistant to the DCI
for Compartmentation

SUBJECT: APEX - A Single System

1. The Second APEX Quarterly Report mentioned that we are examining difficulties perceived in the course of implementing that part of the APEX concept calling for government agencies to deal in a UNIFORM way with industrial contractors who handle SCI. This memorandum is a report of our progress in conducting this examination.

2. Community acceptance of agreed upon physical security standards for the protection of APEX material was finally obtained last month. These standards will be applicable to both government and industry and will serve as physical security criteria for both the government and industry APEX security manuals.

3. The SECOM Staff is coordinating a Community wide analysis of investigative requirements. The key questions being asked are how many years of a person's life do we need to cover and what investigative sources, e.g., neighborhood interviews, police checks, etc., are really necessary in today's environment in order to make a reliable determination about loyalty and trustworthiness. In addition to seeking uniformity, these questions contain obvious heavy resource implications.

4. Uniform appeal procedures when an individual is denied SCI access are in the process of Community coordination.

5. The Security Committee Staff is reviewing the various industrial security forms that have evolved over the years. They are well along in the very necessary process of culling out duplicate and unnecessary requests for information (one contractor claims that he deals with 11 different personnel security forms).

OS 0 0951/7-A

6. The desire expressed by some contractors to have just one cognizant government agency conduct security surveys, no matter how many agencies share their APEX Control Facilities, has not gone beyond the debating stage. While no one is against uniformity per se, or is in favor of security survey redundancies, there is very real concern expressed by Program Managers and Contract Officers that they will stand to lose the necessary degree of control over their own activities.

7. Contractors have, understandably, expressed serious concerns about the lack of transferability of access-approved individuals from one Agency or Program SCI contract to another. This has been impeded by the lack of standardization of investigative and adjudicative procedures mentioned above. As a result, there has been reluctance on the part of the Office of Security, for example, whose investigative criteria, including the use of the polygraph, have been lauded by the Congress, to accept the clearance certifications of other agencies. However, in order to relieve this problem, the Office of Security has recently changed its procedures to grant immediate transferability of SCI approvals upon certification that the individual's status is based on a DCID 1/14 investigation within the last five years. OS will review the actual investigation on a supplemental basis. In the meantime, the individual will be able to be utilized fully according to the approvals held. I believe that this will help significantly to remove an irritant in our relations with contractors.

8. In summary, the creation of APEX has brought into focus several problems based on lack of uniformity in investigative criteria and adjudicative procedures. The least-common-denominator issue has caused those agencies with the most stringent procedures to be, understandably, wary of lowering their standards for the sake of uniformity. The SECOM study has demonstrated to all members that serious deficiencies exist and there is a growing recognition that resources should be found to enable improvements to be made. In the meantime, changes have been implemented which will alleviate some of the concerns expressed by contractors.

[REDACTED]

STAT

SUBJECT: APEX - A Single System

Distribution:

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OS/P&M/PPG/ [] cbt (18Aug80)

Revised: PPG [] sw (17Sep80)

STAT

ORIGINATOR:

STAT

[]

Director of Security

19 SEP 1980

Date